A PLAN FOR
PUBLIC SAFETY

NATE FOR STATE

DELEGATE / DISTRICT 46

Dear Friends & Neighbors:

Baltimore is experiencing a historic wave of gun violence and street crime. Over the past four years, Baltimore has become one of the most dangerous cities in America. Homicides are up approximately 60%. Robberies, carjackings and home break-ins have risen in tandem. But our current state delegates have done nothing to address the crisis.

Over the past year, I have spoken to thousands of people in our district: a retired longshoreman in Canton; an activist and single mother in Cherry Hill; a young financial analyst in Federal Hill; a union member in Brooklyn. Black and white, wealthy and poor, young and old, they all want the same thing: safer streets. Safer streets means being able to take your dog for a walk at night without feeling scared, feeling comfortable sending your kids out to the park to play in the evenings, and not worrying about walking home from the bus stop.

There are solutions to crime and violence, proven policies to help make our streets safe. But their implementation requires energy, resources, and resolve. That's why I'm running for state delegate. I have a four-part plan:

‣ Focus relentlessly on street crime and gun violence
‣ Reform and strengthen the Baltimore Police Department
‣ Expand support for community safety programs, especially after-school programming
‣ Re-focus our justice system on violent criminals

In this plan I outline specific and actionable policy ideas for each step, grounded in the best available social science and data. Some of these recommendations can be implemented by the state legislature directly. Others will take coordination across city, state, and federal public safety agencies. My top priorities will be a new statewide community safety 'block-by-block' grant program and state funding for the Baltimore Police Department for community and beat policing, tied to rapid implementation of the Department of Justice consent decree.

I know what needs to happen. I grew up in Baltimore City and County and have spent more than a decade as an advocate, activist and policy expert. In 2016, President Obama appointed me to run his White House Taskforce for Baltimore City, through which I helped mobilize $110 million in federal funding for Baltimore. My plan is grounded not only in my experience, but in research and in extensive conversations with public safety officials, academics, and citizens. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss these proposals with you and hear your thoughts.

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STEP 1:
FOCUS RELENTLESSLY ON STREET CRIME AND GUN VIOLENCE

> Baltimore is locked in a cycle of crime and violence. Criminals feel increasingly free to break the law, and it is more and more common to resort to guns to settle disputes. As the streets grow more dangerous, people stay locked in their homes; as the streets grow emptier, crime and danger increase in turn. We need to take dramatic steps to break this cycle.

ACTION 1: EXPAND COMMUNITY-ORIENTED, BEAT POLICING

Recommendation: Fund a new state grant program for community and beat policing. Tie funding to police department reform, including successful implementation of the U.S. Department of Justice consent decree and improved police training.

The single most important thing is also the simplest: get cops out walking the beat. This is more than a common-sense approach to crime. The benefits of beat policing are widely confirmed by social science. A visible police presence discourages criminal activity; fosters stronger community-police relations; and brings people out of their homes.[1] When officers walk a beat, they gain a familiarity with the people they serve and vice versa.[2] As a result, community-oriented, beat policing is associated with improved approachability and trust of police officers.[3] This improved trust has a range of benefits, including a heightened willingness of members of the community to

report crime.[4] Evidence from across the country bears out that police patrols are most effective when police officers exit their patrol cars and engage directly with the communities that they serve.[5] For example, in 2008, Newark experimented with a sustained foot patrol program The target area showed a 42% reduction across all crime categories relative to the control areas.[6] Of particular relevance, shootings, aggravated assaults, and murders each decreased over 60% relative to the precinct as a whole.[7]

Beat policing also reduces fear of crime, which is important in its own right. A lot of the cost of crime is direct, paid for in the lives and trauma of its victims. But much of the cost of crime operates indirectly: the fear that attends a stroll around the block that should be safe, or an unwillingness to help members of your community because you fear being taken advantage of or victimized.

ACTION 2: USE EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMS TO BRING DOWN THE MURDER RATE

Recommendation: Fully fund and implement a program of focused deterrence, like Ceasefire, to address gang violence in Baltimore.

Over the past few years, Baltimore has become one of the two most violent cities in America, as measured in terms of the per-capita murder rate. The vast majority of murders are committed by a relatively small number of people in a relatively small area. According to a Baltimore Sun investigation, "80 percent of homicides by shooting were committed in about one-quarter of Baltimore's neighborhoods."[8] This is typical. For instance, 50% of the killings in New Orleans occur in just 5% of its city blocks.[9] Part of this dynamic is driven by gangs: in Cincinnati, 75% of homicides were tied to just 60 groups with a total membership of only 1,500 people.[10]

Research suggests that focused deterrence – i.e. a credible threat of legal action against would-be offenders – combined with programs that offer would-be offenders opportunities to leave behind their criminal lives can help break this cycle of violence.[11] The strongest of these focused-deterrence programs was developed by criminologist David Kennedy in Boston. His program, Ceasefire,* drastically reduced shootings and murders in Boston and in dozens of cities across the U.S.

In the 1990s and again in 2014 Baltimore tried and failed to introduce Ceasefire. The failure was one of implementation: the program was underfunded and Baltimore public safety agencies were unable to work together smoothly.[12]

Programs like Ceasefire and Roca, however, have worked wonders in other cities; with the right implementation, these programs should be able to succeed in Baltimore City as well.[13] Mayor Catherine Pugh recently brought Roca to Baltimore and I will be a strong advocate for supporting this critical effort and reintroducing the David Kennedy model of violence reduction.

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*Confusingly, "Ceasefire" is the name of three separate safety initiatives: David Kennedy's Ceasefire program in Boston; Chicago's Ceasefire (equivalent to Baltimore's Safe Streets"; and Baltimore Ceasefire, a movement started by Errika Bridgeford over the past year.

CASE STUDY: Ceasefire in Boston[14]

Boston's experience with Operation Ceasefire highlights the benefits of targeted deterrence. Operation Ceasefire, which began in 1996, included two main elements: "(1) a direct law-enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns and (2) an attempt to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence."[15] Boston adopted a "pulling levels" strategy whereby it countered gun violence with every tool at its disposal.[16] Specific actions included flagging guns whose traces showed an 18-month or shorter time to crime and focusing enforcement on the makes and calibers of guns most used by gang members; attempting restoration of oblitereated serial numbers and opening investigations based on those restorations; collaborating with the federal government to crack down on interstate gun trafficking; and devoting police-hours to systematic debriefings of arrestees involved with gangs and violent crime so as to maintain a constant stream of actionable intelligence.[17]

The results from Operation Ceasefire were stunning. The city saw a 60% decline in youth homicide.[18] The benefits of Operation Ceasefire extended to other related metrics as well: "a 25% decrease in the monthly number of citywide gun assault incidents, a 32 percent decrease in the monthly number of citywide shots-fired calls for service, and a 44 percent decrease in the monthly number of youth gun assaults."[19] In addition, the police department's increased attention to at-risk communities brought it closer to the population and institutions it polices; in particular, the Boston Police Department gained valuable partnerships with black churches, which helped the Department to overcome its legacy of discrimination.[20] Other cities have seen similar benefits from programs similar to Operation Ceasefire.[21]

ACTION 3: LIGHT UP BALTIMORE CITY STREETS

Recommendation: Establish a state-chartered Public Lighting Authority that would consolidate responsibility for streetlights and mobilize private, state and federal resources to address the lighting challenges in Baltimore.

We have all had the experience of walking down a dark Baltimore street and looking over our shoulder nervously. Hundreds of Baltimore's streetlights are burned out, and hundreds of street were never lit well to begin with. Like beat policing, street lighting directly deters crime. It also helps reassure citizens that our streets are safe, and encourages people to be out at night – which itself helps break the current downwards cycle.

Unfortunately, there is no citywide count of what percentage of streetlights are working, nor any way to prioritize new investments. That's in part because of a convoluted governance system: ownership and maintenance of streetlights is spread across BGE and three different city agencies: Department of Transportation, Department of Recreation and Parks, and

Baltimore City Housing Authority.

I am proposing a new state-chartered Public Lighting Authority that would consolidate responsibility for streetlights and mobilize private, state and federal resources to address the lighting challenges in Baltimore. This model helped Detroit convert 65,000 streetlights to LED in three years and has made Detroit one of the best-lit cities in America.[22]

Today, the vast majority of lights are focused on the streets themselves – not on the sidewalks. The first step should be to dramatically expand sidewalk lights, which can be attached to existing light poles.

CASE STUDY: Detroit, MI

Detroit is a city with parallels to Baltimore. As of the 2010 census, Detroit had a population of just over 700,000, which made it the state's largest city. Over the past decade crime—and particularly violent crime—increased and contributed to a negative feedback loop of worsening material conditions. As the city exited bankruptcy, Detroit sought to reverse its downward spiral with a range of reforms, including establishing a new, state-chartered Public Lighting Authority, which replaced approximately 65,000 lights across the city between 2013 and the end of 2016.[23]

In Detroit, the improved lighting was associated with a range of benefits. A 2012 study found an inverse relationship between lighting density and crime rates across city blocks in Detroit.[24] This result was robust enough to remain statistically significant across all model specifications.[25] Anecdotally, residents report that they feel safer as a result of the installation of street lights.[26] For example, business owners reported increased foot traffic and an increase in revenue of 15% soon after the new lights were installed.[27]

ACTION 4: MAKE THE BPD A NATIONAL LEADER IN USING TECHNOLOGY AND DATA

The BPD lags behind other major police departments in integrating technology and data into its operations. Until recently, for example, the BPD was one of the only large police departments in the country without computers in their cars.[28] Some of the Department's communications and database systems still rely on Lotus 1-2-3, a database software from the 1980s. Michael Bloomberg's recent gift of $5 million for surveillance cameras, gun-shot detection software and license plate readers was a step in the right direction.

As a state delegate, I will be an advocate for the use of technology and data in the recruitment process, deployment of officers, and tracking of violent criminals. BPD should be on the forefront of integrating technology and data into their operations, not holding up the rear.

HIGHLIGHT: PREDICTIVE POLICING

One good example of the use of data is the slightly misnamed "predictive policing" model. Predictive policing uses historical data and computer-driven, statistical analysis to determine the best ways for police forces to prevent crime. A classic example of predictive policing involves analyzing historical data to identify times and places with elevated crime levels, and then altering patrols to ensure a heightened police presence at those times and places.

Los Angeles implemented predictive policing technologies in 2011 and randomized, controlled field experiments show that this technology has already had tremendous results. LA's predictive policing model—called PredPol—correctly predicted the locations of crimes on 4.7% of its guesses, which is more than twice as accurate as human analysts, who were correct just 2.1% of the time.[29] This increased accuracy has profound implications for the quality of policing. Predictive policing technology enables police offices in Los Angeles to detect an extra crime per 1000 minutes of patrol time, which translates into a 7.4% decline in crime.[30] This increased efficiency translates into savings for everyone. Experts estimate that PredPol's results will, when deployed throughout the entire city, translate into savings of "$9 million per year in Los Angeles, taking into account costs to victims, the courts and society."[31]

STEP 2:
REBUILD TRUST IN THE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT

> Illegal and unjust behavior over many years by a number of officers in the Baltimore Police Department has undermined the legitimacy of the Department and in turn undermined community support in many parts of Baltimore. In neighborhoods where people fear or don't trust the police, crimes go unreported, witnesses are hard to find, and more individuals take justice into their own hands. Building a more accountable, fair, and just police department is not only right – it's essential to restoring public safety.

ACTION 1: GET THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONSENT DECREE IMPLEMENTED QUICKLY AND THOROUGHLY

Recommendation: Tie state funding for the Baltimore Police Department to rapid, thorough implementation of the DOJ consent decree.

The U.S. Department of Justice consent decree will not implement itself. Other cities have struggled to implement these decrees. The longer the process of reform, the higher the costs, since cities subject to consent decrees must pay for monitoring by the federal government, which typically runs in excess of $1 million per year.[32] In Los Angeles, the required monitoring cost $11 million for the first five years alone; in Detroit, the monitoring cost $13.8 million for the first six years. [33]

In some cases, the consent decree reforms have taken more than a decade to implement. Los Angeles has taken 12 years to comply with its consent decree at an official cost of $115 million; however, the city's chief legislative analyst estimates the true cost to be in excess of $300 million.[34] Similarly, Detroit took 11 years to meet the stipulations of its consent decree. Detroit city officials do not even "know how much has been spent implementing the [mandated] reforms."

On the other hand, rapid implementation of consent decrees has multiple benefits, like reducing police abuse and improving accountability. It also decreases the number of lawsuits against police departments, protecting taxpayer dollars. As Detroit moved toward substantial compliance with its consent decree, the number of new lawsuits asserting police misconduct declined precipitously from 105 in 2012 to 40 in 2016.[35] As a result, Detroit paid out $4.9 million on such lawsuits in 2016 compared to $7.1 million in 2015, a 31.9% drop in one year alone.[36] Such improved policing is measured not only in dollars and cents, but also a decline in legal cynicism and improvement in how the police are perceived in the communities they serve.[37]

As I wrote in the Washington Post, I am proposing that Maryland create a Baltimore police reform fund that would tie a stream of annual grants for the Baltimore Police Department to successful implementation of the consent decree. The grants would be dedicated exclusively to recruiting, training, and deploying officers for community and beat policing. This fund will help motivate the Baltimore Police Department leadership to execute the consent decree in a timely fashion while focusing state resources on high-priority policing objectives.

ACTION 2: IMPROVE BALTIMORE POLICE DEPARTMENT TRAINING

Recommendation: Hold the Police Department leadership accountable for guaranteeing that every BPD officer hitting the streets understands constitutional policing and has been trained in de-escalation tactics.

Part of reforming the Baltimore Police Department is reforming the process of training our officers. Today, the Police Department's leadership is too ready to let training requirements slide.[38] Becoming a police officer is a serious responsibility and officers must be prepared to deal with complicated social challenges and dangerous situations while continuing to afford citizens their constitutionally protected rights.

Policing training is a big part of this. Twenty-first century police agencies "must contend with new threats, new technologies, new crimes and new communities," such as terrorism; online crimes; and mentally-ill residents who increasingly land in the criminal justice, not mental health systems.[39] At the same time, the "public's expectations have changed, and the public safety arena now includes more stakeholders with whom police must work to tackle some of the endemic and complex issues facing communities."[40] As a result, police agencies must continually evolve, which requires training. Training helps police navigate new policies, react to new crimes, and treat new communities with the dignity and respect they deserve. I will be an advocate for maintaining strong standards in police training.

Alongside traditional training, the Department needs to prioritize constitutional policing practices

and de-escalation of force tactics, and make sure that every cop that graduates is fully prepared for the job. De-escalation of force tactics refer to tactics that reduce the risk that a police officer will need to use force in situations that potentially call for force. De-escalation of force tactics are particularly important in situations that involve people with mental illness, whom police officers tend to perceive as particularly dangerous;[41] in line with this perception, research shows that the police disproportionately use force against people with mental illnesses.[42]

Research shows that de-escalation training can decrease the use of force by police officers.[43] One particularly promising strategy is the Crisis Intervention Model, which "is a collaborative strategy with multiple components to improve police responses to persons with mental illnesses or those experiencing a mental health crisis. The best-known component of the model is the 40-hour training designed to provide select officers with the knowledge, attitudes, and skills to safely and effectively intervene with individuals in crisis and link them to psychiatric care."[44] Officers who undergo this training are "significantly more likely to report verbal engagement or negotiation as the highest level of 'force' used" and have "linked a greater proportion of individuals to psychiatric care (transport to a hospital or other referral) and were less likely to provide no intervention than their non-CIT peers."[45]

ACTION 3: CREATE A NEW POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM COMMISSION

Recommendation: Transform the current civilian review board into a new Police Accountability and Reform Commission

The U.S. Department of Justice has characterized Baltimore's Civilian Review Board as "ineffective… in large part because it has never been provided with adequate authority or resources to perform its intended function."[46]

The problems confronted by Baltimore's Civilian Review Board are, unfortunately, quite common. Without proper staffing, funding, and training, citizen review boards descend into a pattern of inefficacy: they fail to complete investigations in a timely manner, they unhelpfully defer to the police on investigative matters, and they become political scapegoats.[47] As others have observed— including the Baltimore Office of Civil Rights—significant reform of police oversight is necessary.[48]

I am recommending that we establish a new Police Accountability and Reform Commission as an independent watchdog agency. This new Commission, which would subsume the Civilian Review Board, would be charged with four distinct objectives: (1) To root out corruption and abuse; (2) monitor systemic civil rights abuses; (3) investigate general financial and budget mismanagement; and (4) help vet senior police leaders. The new watchdog agency would be given the investigative budget and authority – and would have the natural incentive – to be an effective monitor on the Police Department. In time, this would help to stabilize the Police Department, strengthen leadership and regain community trust.

ACTION 4: BRING MORE CITY RESIDENTS INTO THE POLICE FORCE

Recommendation: Build a police force of and for Baltimore by modifying current strict marijuana-use standards and offering housing incentive.

For 14 of the past 16 years, the Baltimore Police Department has lost more officers than it has recruited.[49] As a result, the Department is down more than 700 officers since 2002.[50] Historically, the BPD recruitment process has been antiquated and slow. Some applicants had to wait as long as a year to be accepted and go through training. The BPD is taking steps to improve its recruitment process, including moving from a paper to a digital application system and speeding up the training timeline. This work must be accelerated.

A related problem is the makeup of the force. In the current force, approximately 80% of officers live outside Baltimore City.[51] Police officers that live in Baltimore City will be more likely to understand the city's challenges, empathize with city residents, and feel that the benefits of their work are benefits to their own community.

As a first step, I am proposing that the state abolish its current rule that disqualifies anyone who has used marijuana in the past three years from joining the BPD. This rule disqualifies many otherwise qualified city residents from becoming police officers. During the first six months of 2017, for example, 7% of all candidates—and 8% of all city-resident applicants—were disqualified for marijuana use, which was the most common reason for disqualifying African-American males. In total, disqualifications for marijuana constituted almost 40 percent of all disqualifications.[52]

I will also advocate for strong incentives for BPD offices to live in Baltimore City, building on the housing tax credit passed by the Baltimore City Council. Having police reside within city limits has been tied to a range of benefits, including "promotion of ethnic balance in the community; reduction in high unemployment rates of inner-city minority groups; improvement of relations between such groups and city employees; enhancement of the quality of employee performance by greater personal knowledge of the city's conditions and by a feeling of greater personal stake

in the city's progress; diminution of absenteeism and tardiness among municipal personnel; ready availability of trained manpower in emergency situations; and the general economic benefits flowing from local expenditure of employees' salaries."[53] Cities as diverse as Atlanta, Chattanooga, and Washington, D.C. have all had success in attracting officers through a combination of hiring preferences for residents, police housing incentives (such as vouchers/discounts and courtesy housing offered by buildings who want an officer to live on-site), and increased advertising to police officers to already-existing housing incentives and programs.[54]

In addition to pushing for policy, I will also work with developers, builders and with organizations like Live Baltimore to help encourage more police to buy home and live in thecity.

STEP 3:
FUND COMMUNITY SAFETY PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY AFTER-SCHOOL PROGRAMS

> We cannot only rely on our formal criminal justice institutions – the police, prosecutors, courts and prisons – to address crime and violence in our city, nor can we arrest our way out of the problem. We must also act as individuals, families, and neighborhoods to discourage crime in our backyards and to shape more positive norms and expectations.

ACTION 1: EXPAND AFTER-SCHOOL PROGRAMMING

Recommendation: Mobilize local, state, federal and private sector resources to expand after-school programming, prioritizing access in low-income neighborhoods

In neighborhood after neighborhood, parents have emphasized to me the importance of after school programming that can provide safe, healthy and productive activities for our city's youth. Their instincts are backed by decades of social science research. Participation in after-school programming is linked to academic achievement, social and emotional development, prevention of risky behaviors, and health and wellness.[55]

After-school programming is particularly important for at-risk youth – young people who are facing challenges at home and struggling to stay on track at school. For these students, after-school programming can mean the difference between graduating and heading to college or into the workforce; or ending up on the streets.[56]

Today, only 15% of Baltimore City students have access to quality after-school programming. Over the past few decades, recreation centers have closed and rec center programs cut back. I have met community leaders fighting day in and day out to set up after-school sports and music programs, but these programs remain constantly starved for resources.

As Delegate, I will focus on expanding state funding for after-school programs for all children, with a focus on community-led programs, and on making sure that every neighborhood has access to a high-quality recreation center. Where state funding can't be found, I'll work to mobilize local, regional, and national philanthropy to invest in our children's future.

ACTION 2: SUPPORT GRASSROOTS PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECTS

Recommendation: Create a new statewide 'community safety block-by-block grant program' with $10 million in annual funding.

Some of the most powerful examples of neighborhood turnaround in Baltimore have been driven from the bottom-up by citizens banding together to address blight and crime. Neighborhood-level programs have been particularly effective in deterring street and property crimes, like muggings, home-break ins, and theft. But this kind of work depends on private and community resources that have been unequally distributed in Baltimore.

I am proposing a statewide community safety grant program that provides funding directly to small, neighborhood-based nonprofit organizations, like community associations, churches, service groups, and community-development corporations. It would fund things as simple as public surveillance cameras or automatic porch lights for rowhouses on dark streets; flashlights and supplies for a neighborhood watch group; small-scale blight reduction; or after-school programs in neighborhoods with high levels of juvenile crime. The program can include training on how to appropriately manage this kind of state funding.

Academic research supports the importance of these programs. For example, a study in the American Sociological Review found that neighborhood associations and other local nonprofits have a major impact on crime rates. Looking at 264 cities over 20 years, the study found that for every 10 additional nonprofits per 100,000 residents, there was a 9% decline in the murder rate.[57]

Grants to community groups help build what academics call "collective efficacy," which is "the glue that binds neighborhoods together."[58] Collective efficacy "helps explain why some communities fight crime and disorder and others do not."[59] Multiple studies have associated collective efficacy with a range of positive outcomes. In cities around the world, scholars have found an inverse relationship between collective efficacy and violence.[60] Other studies have found that collective efficacy is inversely associated with partner violence[61], risky sexual behavior by adolescents[62], sexual initiation by adolescents[63], lack of self-control in children[64]; low self-rated physical health[65]; mortality during heat waves[66]; substance abuse by adolescents[67]; bullying in school[68]; and passive parenting and the attendant delinquency of children[69]. We must restore people's faith in their communities and empower them to create positive change on behalf of themselves and their neighbors.

ACTION 3: FULLY FUND SAFE STREETS

Recommendation: Guarantee full state funding for 10 Safe Streets sites in Baltimore for the next five years.

There is strong evidence that crime spreads within neighborhoods and cities much like an infectious disease.[70] Just as the flu spreads from person to person, violence spreads within communities as acts of violence are normalized and as retributions spark further retributions.[71] We must complement beat policing with a public-health approach to crime, working within our neighborhoods to identify and stop violence before it spreads. The Safe Streets program in Baltimore attempts to do just that, and has a strong track record of reducing violence, as Johns Hopkins Professor Daniel Webster has

shown.. Adam Milam and his colleagues surveyed attitudes on and perceptions of gun violence both before and after implementation of the Safe Streets program, and found an improvement in 43% of the attitudes toward gun violence in Safe Streets sites compared to a 13% improvement in control communities.[72] Moreover, three of the four Safe Streets intervention sites "experienced relatively large program-related reductions in at least one measure of gun violence without also having a statistically significant increase in another measure of gun violence."[73]

Baltimore is not the only city that has seen promising results from programs like Safe Streets, which is modeled on a Chicago program called "CeaseFire."** Chicago implemented its CeaseFire campaign in 1999. Having observed that violence often results from casual situations, such as disputes over property or relationships in the neighborhood, the CeaseFire program sought to reduce violence by using volunteers to intervene in these and other disputes that have the potential to give rise to violence.[74] More generally, the CeaseFire program sought to change community views and norms with respect to violence. The program used violence interrupters who themselves grew up in the neighborhoods they served, and had themselves been involved in gangs and violence.[75]

"The neighborhoods involved in the program were typically plagued by high rates of violence, and the residents were quite poor. Most were located in the City of Chicago... Among the programs monitored, eleven served predominately African American neighborhoods, six were largely Latino, and four served diverse populations. An analysis of the sites... found that most program sites were well above the city median in terms of both crime and poverty."[76] The program used local community groups as a force multiplier, and relied heavily on local clergy.[77]

The effects of CeaseFire were both large and statistically significant. Targeted neighborhoods exhibited a 17-24% decline in shootings.[78] A few of the declines were not statistically significant or were observed in the corresponding control areas; however, four of the eight areas studied exhibited large, statistically significant declines not observed in control areas.[79] Moreover, the study found the declines to be so robust to the passage of time that the authors characterized them as "permanent."[80] The average CeaseFire site cost $240,000 per year.[82]

The Maryland State Legislature took a first step towards funding Safe Streets this year in passing Tyrone Ray Safe Streets Act, which expands funding to the Safe Streets initiative by $3.6 million. I am pleased that Governor Hogan ultimately signed the bill. However, we need to put this critical program on a more stable, long-term funding path to avoid the annual scramble.

** Again, note that Chicago's Ceasefire is distinct from the Boston Ceasefire program discussed above.

STEP 4:
RE-FOCUS OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM ON VIOLENT CRIMINALS

> Our justice system should not punish for the sake of punishment: prison time should be meted out as a deterrent and when required to take dangerous offenders off the streets. That means reducing jail time for non-violent drug offenders and focusing on treatment, but also holding repeat violent offenders accountable, even those under the age of 18.

ACTION 1: BRING BALANCE TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Except for the most violent offenders, most young people who commit crimes can and want to turn their lives in a better direction. We owe these young people something better than a reflexive use of the criminal justice system. But repeat juvenile offenders cannot commit violent crime with impunity.

Doing better by our children starts with identifying at-risk youth and directing them towards evidence-based programs that can keep them on the straight and narrow. When kids first begin to misbehave, we should look to restorative justice as an alternative to punishment. Baltimore is lucky to be home to the Community Mediation Conference, one of the strongest restorative justice programs in the country. By bringing together young people with their family, law enforcement officials, and victims, these programs have been shown to significantly reduce re-offending rates.

Academic studies show that restorative justice not only reduces recidivism, but lowers expenses by relieving the burden on the criminal justice system, which is generally more expensive than services provided by organizations like the Community Mediation Center.[83] We should expand these programs, and for those young people who are in juvenile detention, make sure they have access to a quality education.

Another proven model for keeping kids on the right path are police-youth partnerships, which provide mentorship to populations that sorely lack mentors while simultaneously knocking down the barriers that divide police from the youth they police; in four cities studied by the Eisenhower Foundation, such partnerships had statistically significant effects on crime, which ranged from a 22% to a 27% decline. [84]

But these programs, however effective, will not keep everyone out of trouble. Some juvenile offenders – particularly those repeatedly committing violent crimes – must be recognized as dangers to society and treated accordingly. There's a difference between acting out as an expression of frustration and anger, and threatening people with guns, knives, and other weapons. Maryland should explore expanding the use of blended sentences, which combine juvenile sentences and adult sentences, with the possibility of annulling adult sentences for good behavior.

ACTION 2: FOR NON-VIOLENT DRUG OFFENDERS, PIVOT AWAY FROM JAIL TIME AND TOWARDS TREATMENT

Recommendation: Require city prosecutors to present evidence about the costs of incarceration as compared to the costs for drug treatment for all non-violent drug offenders.

Juveniles are not the only Baltimoreans who can benefit from diversion programs. Baltimore has long resorted to jail time for low-level drug offenses when the best available evidence demonstrates that diversion programs can achieve superior outcomes.[85] Seattle's diversion policies, for example, decreased the number of repeat offenses by 60% relative to a control group that did not benefit from diversion. Worse yet, when we permit law enforcement officers to police low-level offenses aggressively, their pattern of arrests and convictions show unacceptable racial disparities.[86]

Not only is the criminal justice system less effective at addressing the problems posed by low-level drug offenses, it is also more costly.[87] This is a lose-lose bargain that we must reject; we cannot merely let the chips fall where they may when the damage caused by the criminal justice system is measured in shattered families, deepened ties to criminal activity, and an inability to turn one's life around and find dignity in work.

Baltimore has already taken some steps in the right direction. During the 2016 legislative session, Maryland passed the Justice Reinvestment Act, which requires parole officers to determine whether defendants might benefit from substance use disorder treatment with the aim of making it more likely that low-level offenders will receive treatment rather than jail time.[88] Baltimore deepened its commitment to diversion in December 2016 when it announced the Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion program, which seeks to send "people they stop for minor drug and prostitution offenses to

treatment programs rather than jail."[89] Currently, the LEAD program only operates in the west Baltimore.

These steps are improvements over the usual way of doing things, but we must go further. I am therefore proposing that in every case involving a non-violent drug offender, we require the prosecutor on the case to tender evidence at sentencing as to the cost of incarceration, probation, or other such outcome relative to local, evidence-based treatment options. For first-time offenders specifically, I propose the State's Attorney Office adopt formal guidelines that would require pre-booking diversion unless the State's Attorney decides that a trial or disposition by plea would better serve the interests of justice than would treatment.

ACTION 3: IMPROVE OUR TRACK RECORD OF PROSECUTING VIOLENT CRIMINALS

Recommendations: Strengthen the State's Attorney Office and improve coordination with the Baltimore Police Department.

Even when violent criminals are apprehended, they often aren't prosecuted, and when prosecuted, they often aren't convicted. Over the past few years, the rate of successful prosecutions by the State's Attorney has dropped dramatically. In 2016, Prosecutors dropped, lost, hung, or pled out over 80% of cases that went to trial; and of the gun crimes that went to trial, the States' Attorney Office lost 65%.[90] I will be a strong advocate for professionalism and competency in the State's Attorney Office.

ACTION 4: STOP CRIMINALIZING POVERTY IN OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM

Recommendation: Build on cash bail reforms by referring unemployed criminals facing minor charges to job programs.

Cash bail injects additional inequality into our already unequal criminal justice system by requiring that defendants who are sufficiently impoverished await trial from a jail cell while their more financially well-off counterparts go free. This practice should offend every American's notion of fairness; we cannot abide such unequal outcomes in a country that proclaims that everyone is equal before the law. More is at stake, however, than abstract notions of fairness: people held in jail to await trial often lose their jobs and their housing; miss out on important family moments; and are excluded from the institutions and opportunities for drug or mental health treatment, which are far more robust outside of the jail cell than within.[91] And like so many ill-advised criminal justice practices, taxpayers ultimately must foot the bill for this entirely avoidable, pre-trial incarceration, which costs 11 times as much as serving a non-incarcerated defendant.[92]

For good reason, then, Maryland has begun to reform its practices regarding cash bail. In July of 2017, the Court of Appeals implemented a rule requiring courts to use alternatives to cash bail when practical, and to avoid bail amounts that the defendant cannot pay.[93] As a result, the percentage of

defendants held on cash bail declined from 40.2% to 20.8%. Notably, the number of defendants who failed to appear from their trial—the outcome that bail is designed to avoid—declined from 10.1% to 9.2%.[94]

I applaud recent reform of the cash bail system, but we must go further. As Baltimore pivots away from cash bail, we must ensure that we have thoughtful, pre-trial programs that ensure people continue to show up for trial while simultaneously discouraging illegal, pre-trial conduct. The Work First Foundation, which stablizies, trains, and finds employment for people accused of crimes, is a promising model. Judges in eight district courts , including the Baltimore City District Court, currently refer participants to the Foundation, and of the people referred to the Foundation: 89% graduate from their job training program; 61% are placed into employment; and 75% of participants have their cases dismissed or otherwise disposed of absent a finding of guilt.[95] I propose that we fund and expand these programs, and that we move to a system whereby all first-time, non-violent offenders are released into job programs.

CONCLUSION

Baltimore has tremendous natural strengths: a major port, world-class medical and educational institutions, and deep wells of creativity. Most importantly, we have a dedicated, committed citizenry. I grew up in this city and believe our future is bright. But we are facing significant challenges. In the long-term, we have to expand economic opportunity by investing in our young people, strengthening schools, creating pathways into the workforce for the unemployed, raising wages for working people, and bringing more jobs to the Baltimore region. I have detailed proposals for how we can achieve these goals.

But none of that will be possible unless we address the wave of crime and violence in Baltimore right now. Street crime and gun violence are costing lives, shutting down businesses and discouraging business investment. That's why I've laid out a four-step plan for immediate action.

First, we have to focus relentlessly on street crime and gun violence to break the city's downward spiral of crime and violence. We need to expand community and beat policing, light up city streets, use evidence-based programs to bring down the murder rate, and make the BPD a national leader in using data and technology.

Second, we need to work to reform and strengthen the Baltimore Police Department by getting the US Department of Justice consent decree implemented quickly and thoroughly, improving Baltimore Police Department training, creating a new police accountability and reform commission, and bringing more city residents into the police force.

Third, we have to work to expand support for community safety programs. We need to expand funding for after-school programming, support grassroots public safety projects, and fully fund the Safe Streets programs.

Fourth, we have to re-focus our justice system on violent criminals. Our goal should be to remove dangerous people from our streets while providing opportunities for rehabilitation.

This plan will save lives. It will make our streets, parks, and playgrounds safe for kids and families. We will be able retain our population, attract more people back to the city and create more jobs. It will push the city into a virtuous cycle of growth.

This plan is practical. Working across city, state, and Federal lines, we can implement these policies in a matter of months and immediately start reducing gun violence and crime.

This plan starts with the coming election. I'm asking for your vote on June 26 so I can serve you in Annapolis as a State Delegate. But the work will continue beyond the election, continue until our streets are safe, no matter where you live in the city.

Together, we can build a safer, stronger Baltimore.

ABOUT NATE AND THE CAMPAIGN

Nate grew up in southwest Baltimore, where he learned the value of community building from his parents and neighbors. As a boy, he lived on Hollins Street, just off Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard. His father, Stephan Loewentheil, had long dreamed of starting his own business and in 1988 opened a restaurant, the Cultured Pearl. The Cultured Pearl was a neighborhood favorite for more than a decade, serving up drinks, poetry and the city's best Mexican food. From his father, Nate learned the recipe of hard work and dedication that drives small business owners in Baltimore. Nate's mother, Beth, worked as a public defender in Baltimore's federal courts. Two decades of seeing her work tirelessly for justice for Baltimore's citizens inspired Nate to commit himself to a career in public service.

After attending college and law school, Nate went to work full-time for President Obama at the White House as an economic advisor. In 2015, President Obama assigned Nate to lead a White House Taskforce for Baltimore City. As Director of the Taskforce, Nate secured $110 million in Federal funds for Baltimore. He called dozens of federal agencies to secure hundreds of paid summer jobs for Baltimore City school kids, identified $750,000 in federal funds to help neighborhoods clean up their parks, found federal resources for the Safe Streets program to help Cherry Hill and McElderry Park to reduce the murder rate, and secured tens of millions of dollars for transportation projects, including improvements to North Avenue.

Today, Nate lives on Patterson Park in southeast Baltimore, where he is an active member of the Highlandtown Community Association and the Patterson Park Neighborhood Association and a little league coach. He is the founder of a new organization, Baltimore Homecoming, that re-engages Baltimore natives living around the U.S. to encourage them to invest their time, money, and energy in their hometown.

Nate's running for state delegate as a Democrat in Maryland's 46th legislative district. The district is represented by one state senator and three state delegates. The primary election is on June 26. Learn more at our website, www. nateforstate2018.com, and follow us on Facebook, www.facebook. com/nateforstate.

ENDNOTES

[1] Evidence abounds that foot patrols deter crime through increased probability of dection. E.g., Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S. Nagin, "Imprisonment and crime: Can both be reduced," Criminology & Public Policy 10, no. 1 (2011). Community - oriented, beat policing also improves approachability, familiarity, and trust between police and the communities they serve. Elizabeth R. Groff et al., "Does What Police Do at Hot Spots Matter? The Philadelphia Policing Tactics Experiment," Criminology 53, no. 1 (2014): 26; Rob-ert Trojanowicz, "Evaluating a neighborhood foot patrol program: The Flint, Michigan Project," in Community crime Prevention: Does it work?, ed. Dennis Rosenbaum (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1986), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=96565.

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Executive Research Forum and Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2009),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/law%20enforcement%20technology%20needs%20assessment%202009.pdf: 6. Mobile computers in particular have a range of benefits, including reducing dispatcher staffing needs, minimizing the time officers spend on administrative tasks, relieving radio congestion, enabling more effective deployment of resources, avoiding the cost of paper, and improving the quality of records. Margaret Jacobs, Mobile Computing Technologies, (Alexandria: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2006), http://www.theiacp.org/portals/ Association of the Chiefs of Police estimate the savings from mobile computing technologies to be "20 - 40 percent" once "savings in time, personnel, money, consumables, accuracy, and safety." Jacobs, Mobile Computing Technologies, 135. It is for good reason then that police officers consistently designate mobile computers as "particularly critical to addressing high priority needs in law enforcement." Koper, Law Enforcement Technology Needs Assessment, 7.

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mandatory training on use of force, arrests and holds for mental health (Portland: Portland Police Bureau Training Division, 2013).

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[47] Attard, 2013: 5-8; Hernandez-Figueroa, 2013: 7; Clarke, 2009: 2, 16; Ofer, 2016: 1044-52; Finn, 2001: 88 et seq., 128 et seq.

[48] The Baltimore Office of Civil Rights writes, "The cumulative [result of the deficiencies in the Citizen Review Board] has been a statutorily weak, chronically under-resourced Board dependent on the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) to function, as well as a justified public perception that the Board is a "Toothless Tiger" with little to no influence . . . . In order to alter the status quo and shift the prevailing paradigm, a number of legislative changes must occur, and soon."

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Patrick Sharkey, Gerard Torrats-Espinosa, and Delaram Takyar, "Community and the Crime Decline: The Causal Effect of Local Nonprofits on Violent Crime," American Sociological Review 82, no. 6 (2017): 1214–40, doi:10.1177/0003122417736289.

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[60] See, generally, John R. Hipp and James C. Wo. "Collective Efficacy and Crime," International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 169–73, Elsevier, 2015, doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.45045-2. This inverse relationship has studied in most detail in Chicago. See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, Felton Earls, "Neighborhoods and violent crime: a multilevel study of collective efficacy." Science 277 (August, 15 1997): 918–924; Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, "Systematic social observation of public spaces: a new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods," American Journal of Sociology 105, no. 3 (1999). But the effect has been observed in cities as diverse as Stockholm (Robert J. Sampson and Per-Olof H.Wikstrom, "The social order of violence in Chicago and Stockholm neighborhoods: a comparative inquiry," in Order, Conflict, and Violence, Eds. Kalyvas, S.N., Shapiro, I., Masoud, T (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)); Tianjin, China (Zhang, Lening, Messner, Steven F., Liu, Jianhong. "A multilevel analysis of the risk of Household Burglary in the city of Tianjin, China," British Journal of Criminology 47, no. 6: 918–937, doi:10.1093/bjc/azm026); and Brisbane (Mazerolle, Lorraine, Rebecca Wickes, and James McBroom, "Community Variations in Violence: The Role of

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